Before Geneva

Each of the chief western negotiators regarded the Geneva Conference as a different prospect—an opportunity for a bargain with communist China, a chance for peace, or a time to present a credible military deterrent in Southeast Asia. Yet none of the western allies denied Indochina’s importance as a Cold War issue or the danger that the war posed to France’s position as a core NATO ally. Bidault looked upon the settlement as a test of France’s global role—a part of what one historian has described as “a question of self-esteem.” Failure in Indochina, Bidault and Laniel warned, would break French resolve to persist with containment in Europe. ¹ From the opposition benches, Radical deputy Pierre Mendès-France would have preferred direct negotiation with Ho Chi Minh, but only because he wanted to minimize Chinese and Soviet influence in Vietnamese affairs and thereby swiftly execute a French military withdrawal. ² Eden also sought to contain Chinese influence in Indochina, but he envisaged a territorial compromise with China and the Vietminh that would divide Vietnam into two states. ³ Dulles argued that a confrontation between an allied force and the Vietminh would reverse the military balance and prevent a French “sell-out” at Geneva. ⁴ Accepting the direst political consequences of a French defeat, Eisenhower concluded: “We must have collective security or we’ll fall.” ⁵ Before the Geneva Conference opened, Bidault cautioned Dulles that the western alliance had lost its chance to present a unified position at Geneva. Dulles reported to Eisenhower:

“He [Bidault] saw nothing to prevent a Communist victory throughout the whole area … If this disaster happened, effects would not be limited to Indochina or even to the EDC but would threaten whole NATO structure.”