ABSTRACT
United Action, the US plan for allied intervention announced by Dulles on 29 March, served as an alternative to a ceasefire agreement at Geneva. The prospect of allied military support, if not outright intervention by sea and air, would keep the French Expeditionary Corps and VNA in the field. In this regard, allied intervention aimed as much at the French National Assembly in Paris as at the Vietminh. In contrast, the French government looked upon internationalization as a bluff—one of the few cards the western alliance held at the bargaining table. Most French policymakers, including Bidault and Navarre, feared the political consequences of US intervention. Once allied forces were committed, even in a limited way, France would lose its chance for an abrupt end to the fighting in Vietnam by way of negotiations at Geneva. Before April 1954—and the immediate prospect of humiliation at Dien Bien Phu—Bidault and Laniel opposed US entry into the war because United Action, the American scheme to internationalize the conflict, precluded any negotiated settlement. Operation Vulture, a short-lived French scheme for US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu, aimed to stave off disaster before Geneva. The two plans ought not to be confused, although each represented the French and American counter positions on allied intervention. 1
