ABSTRACT
The innovation, if there is one, in Intelligence Led Policing is to realise that the random patrolling of the uniformed officer and the post hoc investigations of the detective are very inefficient methods of dealing with crime and disorder. The police are becoming more proactive in targeting the offender and the potential offender rather than waiting for an offence to be committed and then responding. The difficulty with this approach is that the gathering and analysis of intelligence is a complex and time-consuming activity which demands considerable resources to produce tangible results. It is yet to be demonstrated to be an efficient and cost-effective method of dealing with the type of problems which regularly mar the lives of ordinary citizens as they go about their business. (Sharp 2005: 455)
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as mentioned by Sharp above, have been among the driving forces for intelligence-led policing from the outset. If the move towards a more judicious and rational use of police resources and energies is expected to produce tangible results, how does one show that to be the case? Evaluation is essential to the development of any crime reduction strategy, and Don Weatherburn (2004: 36-38) identified five features of a rational approach to crime control:
Measuring and monitoring crime patterns (Weatherburn’s first feature) is essential as a first stage in determining whether policies are successful in
combating crime. It also provides government with evidence to address the claims of the more reactionary media and public. Within this framework, the second feature (allowing open access to information) can prevent claims that the police are ‘cooking the books’ and lay a framework for the sort of honest debate about crime that is required in a democracy. Weatherburn’s third feature (evidence-based policymaking) should be an essential function of good government. In other words, before embarking on a new crusade, politicians and other decision-makers should be aware of the research that can inform them of what works and what does not work to reduce particular crime problems. Rigorous evaluation (Weatherburn’s fourth feature) is essential if decision-makers are to know whether they have been successful in preventing crime – and that is the subject of this chapter. Finally, without a broader approach to crime control, one that is devoid of ideology or a desire to fixate on one particular part of the criminal justice system, truly imaginative crime reduction is unlikely to occur. As can be seen from Weatherburn’s list, evaluation is essential not only to inform existing operations, but also to influence the path of future evidence-based policies.
