ABSTRACT
A debate has long existed in jurisprudence over how best to characterise the role of morality in the practice of law. While some authors (legal positivists) claim there is no necessary connection between law and morality, many others suggest the interplay between law and morality is more complex and nuanced than this suggests. As this issue is particularly vexed in the case of legal reasoning, it demands our attention here. We need to consider whether and how legal reasons and justifi cations can meaningfully be insulated from moral reasons and justifi cations, and whether it makes sense to do so; moreover, what is actually at stake in our assessment of these questions? In order to explore these issues, we will focus on another landmark medical law case that has been interpreted by John Finnis, who argues against the legal positivists’ position by claiming that the case he discusses exemplifi es how legal reasoning is best understood as an instantiation of general practical reason. This is the case of Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland .
