ABSTRACT
Views of grammar are critically dependent on assumptions made about semantics. In particular, the autonomy of grammar appears self-evident given the prevalent assumption that meanings consist of truth conditions. The meaningfulness of grammatical elements becomes apparent only by adopting a conceptualist semantics that properly accommodates our ability to conceive and portray the same objective situation in alternate ways. The term conceptualization (emphasis original) is interpreted broadly as embracing any kind of mental experience. It subsumes (a) both established and novel conceptions, (b) not only abstract or intellectual “concepts” but also sensory, motor, and emotive experience, (c) conceptions that are not instantaneous but change or unfold through processing time; and (d) full apprehension of the physical, social, cultural, and linguistic context. Thus, far from being either static or solipsistic, conceptualization is viewed as the dynamic activity of embodied minds interacting with their environment. (Langacker, 1998: 3)
