ABSTRACT
… [W]hat is needed is not the cognitive science now available, but work which starts with empirically grounded observations about interaction, with practices of talk and other conduct in interaction which appear to underlie these observations, and with the organizations of practice which make for the recognizable features of interaction that constitute the distinctive sociality of humans. In other words, what is needed is not an analysis of interaction trimmed to meet the available cognitive science, but an account of how humans grasp the world and interact with it that takes account of the resources of interaction, on the one hand, and contributes to understanding its workings and capacities, on the other—a cognitive science whose ambition is to address observable, actual, ordinary human activity in a fashion at once answerable to the details of actual instances of talk and other conduct, on the one hand, and formulated to such general and formal terms as to embrace diverse exemplars of a phenomenon, on the other. (Schegloff, 2006: 142–43)
