ABSTRACT
Multi-level polities consist of multiple sovereign units with potentially distinct cultures, administrative traditions, political interests and substantive and procedural legal regimes. This diversity stands both as an advantage and a disadvantage for the governance of post-modern multi-level polities. On the one hand diversity contributes to innovation, flexibility and responsiveness in policymaking and enforcement. On the other hand, it may seriously jeopardize the consistency and, ultimately, effectiveness of policies as well as raising compliance costs for those affected by the policy in question. Arguably one of the greatest challenges for the governance of multi-level polities is the designing of policymaking and enforcement mechanisms that strike an optimal balance between these advantages and disadvantages. The question becomes even more complicated when it comes to competition law and policy. Due to the ever expanding integration between different economies and sectors, anticompetitive behaviour affects multiple markets and, thus, engenders action by multiple authorities under potentially diverse standards. The concept of ‘antitrust federalism’ was coined by students of competition law in search of the answer to this question. This concept takes a constitutional law perspective; and it attempts to address how competition laws and authorities of constituent units interact (or should interact) with each other under the constitutional law principles of the polity in question.
