ABSTRACT
In Chapter 10 we discussed how, in the 1990s, cyberspace was hailed by some as an arena for the realization of the disembodied mind and, the computer interface, the place where ‘the spirit migrates from the body’ (Heim, 1993, p. 101). The aim of these early Internet theorists seems to have been to champion ‘disembodied technocracy’ (Gunkel, 1998, p. 119) in an attempt to fulfil some form of Cartesian ideal: ‘to live “purely” in the realm of the mind freed from [one’s] corporeity’ (Switzer, 1997, pp. 511–512). Towards the end of the last chapter, however, and following those who over the last 20 years have opposed this view, we argued that claims about cyberspace – that it represents a bastion for the Cartesian self, where personal identity could be experienced independent of bodily attributes, not fixed or limited by physical characteristics (Slater, 1998) – were in fact mistaken. Consequently, we rejected such ‘incorporeal exaltation’ (Gunkel, 1998, p. 118), judging it to be hyperbole and, instead, embraced a less accommodating view of disembodiment.
