ABSTRACT
In Chapter 3, we discussed Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, which posits that the mere thought of a taboo violation is sufficient to elicit a visceral response characteristic of disgust. We then conjectured that if simply thinking about such prohibited acts is capable of triggering a disgust response then it is a relatively small step to the claim that any virtual display of taboo violation should have a similar effect. However, before such a claim can be supported, we must overcome the paradox of fiction. Essentially, the paradox centres on the question of whether it is possible to express genuine emotion towards a character (or event) known to be fictitious. Over the years, many embroiled in this debate have argued that it is not, claiming instead that the putative emotional response is somehow ‘not the same’; others disagree, considering the paradox itself to be fictitious – a pseudo-problem.
