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The early warning system as an accountability mechanism
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The early warning system as an accountability mechanism book
The early warning system as an accountability mechanism
DOI link for The early warning system as an accountability mechanism
The early warning system as an accountability mechanism book
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ABSTRACT
In the overall discussion of the European Union’s institutional framework, a branch of literature has developed that occupies itself with the Union’s accountability. It is true that the term ‘accountability’ as an umbrella term has come to mean all manner of good things, including transparency, responsiveness or simply ethical behaviour. 1 Yet it is also possible to narrow down accountability to a relationship between an actor and a forum whereby the forum may ask questions and the actor must justify his conduct under the threat of consequences in case of dissatisfactory answers. This is the defi nition Bovens has put forward and which has gained broad acceptance in the literature. 2
When applying accountability theory to the European Union, some rather bleak pictures have been drawn. First of all, several developments already inhibit the exercise of accountability to national parliaments even without the complicating factor of the EU, such as new public management that addresses the citizen while bypassing parliaments, the agentifi cation of governance and the deliberate depoliticisation of executive action. 3 As regards the EU, very prominently Harlow has made a strong case for a more cautious approach to European integration in the light of the structural accountability defi cits that have emerged in that context. 4 Gustavsson et al. have even brought out an edited volume exploring what they term the ‘illusion of accountability’ in the EU. 5 In it, the gaps in sustaining accountability for the exercise of formally delegated but effectively irretrievable powers is highlighted, 6 especially if this exercise involves informal processes and civil servants acting as policy-makers. 7 Of course we may choose a nuanced approach, such as the one offered by Menon and Weatherill, who acknowledge the limitations of attempts to legitimise far-reaching delegation of powers to the EU by means of accountability models originally designed for nation-states. 8 Still, no matter which way we turn, it is fair to say that accountability is not the European Union’s strong suit.