A view on language is sketched in the above chapters but many diffi cult questions remain. How can we say that a legal judgment is based on a text? How do we decide what the text means and what it commands? With the insights into language drawn from Wittgenstein and Derrida we are now better equipped to tackle these questions. But these theories contain nothing that can anchor meaning for the purposes of a theory of legal interpretation. It is necessary to widen the scope of research from the philosophy of language to interpretation and understanding on a more general level. This way we may get a better grip on the diffi cult questions of legal interpretation. Therefore, after the rather narrow discussion of language and meaning, the question that now has to be addressed is that of interpretation. We can already see that it is unavoidable to study interpretation as an activity, not just language as a system, in order to be able to answer any questions concerning legal interpretation. When focusing on the activity of interpretation, the interconnectedness of meaning and the choices of living, people in different circumstances become more visible. Interpretation is always done by someone in a certain time and place. In this chapter, interpretation is studied in the hermeneutics of HansGeorg Gadamer and the semiotics of Umberto Eco. After this we can turn to Derrida’s deconstruction, which includes a critique of hermeneutics.