ABSTRACT
This is the first of the three chapters constituting Part II, which is dedicated to the translation of preferences into votes through the processes of strategic voting and strategic coalition. In particular, this chapter discusses the extent, determinants, and effect of strategic voting (or Duverger’s “psychological factor”) in a presidential election by plurality rule, using Korean election survey data. By so doing, it addresses some weaknesses in the existing literature on strategic voting. First, the literature on strategic voting is largely based on the experience of electoral behavior in established Western democracies (e.g. Cox 1997; Alvarez and Nagler 1997; Abramson et al. 1992; Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992; Johnston and Pattie 1991; Galbraith and Rae 1989; Bensel and Sanders 1979; Black 1978; Cain 1978; Fisher 1972; Spafford 1972; and Shively 1970). 1 A comprehensive literature review (Cox 1997: 85) observes that “[i]n contrast to the plethora of studies of tactical voting in Britain, very little has been written on other countries employing simple plurality … There are a few studies of Canadian and New Zealand experience, but none that I know concerning India, Trinidad and Tobago, or other developing countries that also use simple plurality.” Along with the next chapter on India, this study, based on a presidential election data set in Korea, would thus be one of the few attempts to address the issue of strategic voting in non-Western developing countries.
