I began this study a few years ago, when experts considered the war in Iraq to be a breaking point in the relations between the United States and Europe. Speculations about a doomed future had just become radicalized, due to Donald Rumsfeld’s snide comments comparing a “new” Europe, mainly Eastern Europe along with Italy and Spain, which was ready to embark on military missions and an “old” Europe, primarily France and Germany, which was continuing to count on diplomacy as an effective means to solve international problems. Naturally, some objected to the source of those comments and the evidence or lack thereof linked to the so-called problem. But what is more important is that in 2003, transatlantic relations became less dull for international relations specialists, and they started once again to publish on this subject. 1 They were, however, deeply divided: while neorealists anticipated a deterioration of Euro-American relations, neoliberals predicted the endurance of transatlantic cooperation, as seen in chapter 3. The debate then shifted and began to address the future role of NATO. It focused on whether a foreign policy common to the whole of the European Union could challenge the harmonious relationship of the allies, and what part, if any, Russia was likely to play within this new context. 2

In order to assess the validity of the predictions of both the neoliberals and ne-realists, it has, therefore, been crucial to refl ect on how the United States and Europe have continued to interact. This book has argued that disagreements between the transatlantic partners are the consequences of changing identities within the Atlantic area. The clash over the Iraq War was not, in fact, a new and defi ning disagreement, indicating a political rift between the United States and Europe. Rather it was just another crisis that some pundits found alarming. This book has had the aim of demonstrating that disagreements among allies are not really that shocking and that they were certainly not the result of the end of the East/West confrontation, as many have argued. By taking a constructivist stand, I have shown how such disagreements depend on the evolution of the identity of the partners, an evolution that has at its core the question of values. I have revealed how that evolution has infl uenced and redefi ned the interests of the partners, and I have shown the impact that this has had on their policies. This redefi nition,

I have contended, changes the normative context and, more broadly, the international environment. Thus, contemporary disagreements are to be viewed as a continuation of the evolution, rather than as a breaking point. These refl ections also enable us to better understand the West in the postCold War era, when defi ning the West purely by its juxtaposition with the Soviet Union is no longer possible.