Reflections on deterrence

A study of the evolution of naval warfare from 1815 to 1914, leading ultimately to the focus on the battle fleet and the dreadnought, provides an excellent opportunity for a discussion of the nature of deterrence in sea power. Analysis of the concept of deterrence itself poses rather unique difficulties. As Louise Arbour, prosecutor for the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, remarked in 1999, in assessing the success or failure of any policy of deterrence we face the task of “measuring what did not occur.” ¹ The utility of the large armored warship came under attack at its birth in the early 1860s, during the era of the Jeune École, and again after 1918, with the emergence of air power and in light of the fact that battleships had spent most of the First World War rusting at anchor, while smaller vessels did the bulk of the fighting at sea. Twentieth-century critics of battleship construction have argued that most countries could have done without them. Their judgements have been harsh for the pre-1914 naval programs of every country except Britain, the United States, and Japan, on the grounds that for the others some less expensive combination of cruisers and lighter craft would have provided a better actual fighting force. ²