The discussions of the preceding chapters have led to what may seem to be an excessively sharp polarisation between the subjective view, in which probability is the degree of belief of an individual, and the objective view, in which probabilities are features of the material world like charges or masses. In this chapter I want to try to moderate this difference by suggesting that there are some intermediate cases. Accordingly in the section ‘Intersubjective probability’, I will introduce a further interpretation of probability – the intersubjective – which, as the name suggests, lies somewhere between the subjective and the objective. Then in the section ‘The spectrum from subjective to objective’, I will try to show that there is a spectrum of positions between the subjective and the fully objective, and I will try to analyse the character of this spectrum. This analysis naturally suggests that there is not a single notion of probability, but rather several different, though interconnected, notions of probability which apply in different contexts. In the section ‘Pluralist views of probability’, I will discuss such pluralist views of probability.