ABSTRACT
The European war which broke out in August 1914 was expected to be
a short one. The German Crown prince looked forward to a ‘bright and
jolly war’. No European government had made extensive economic or
military plans for a prolonged struggle – the Russian Ministry of War in
1914 was typical in preparing for a struggle of two to six months. Belief in
the power of the offensive to deliver a rapid knockout blow to the enemy
was strong, though developments in military technology since 1871 should
have suggested otherwise. Furthermore, it was assumed that the economic
consequences of a lengthy conflict would be so ruinous that European
countries would be brought to their knees by financial chaos within
months. Sir Edward Grey, in July 1914, had speculated that a European
war involving Austria, France, Russia and Germany ‘must involve the
expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such interference with trade,
that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of
European credit and industry’. In declaring war against each other in 1914
the European great powers envisaged a series of short, sharp, military
encounters, to be followed presumably by a general conference of the
belligerents, which would confirm the military results by a political and
diplomatic settlement. The confident British expectation that its
expeditionary forces would be home by Christmas was echoed in the
other capitals of Europe.