ABSTRACT
Was containment in Europe a success, a failure, or a misreading of key European dynamics? How accurate is it to talk of US hegemony or even empire in Europe, be it the constructs of neo-marxist economic determinism or voluntaristic forms, such as Geir Lundestad’s ‘empire by integration/ invitation’ and Charles S. Maier’s ‘analog of empire’?1 Whatever the answers, it is clear that after 1950 Western Europe was a difficult theatre for US policy-makers. ‘Inconvenient’ leaders could not be toppled, nor client states built, nor economic aid determine outcomes decisively. Rather, Europe was the home of long-established states who were both America’s key allies and disturbingly prone to regard the Cold War as an important but secondary issue next to their defence of established interests, their adjustment to a post-colonial world, and their post-war battle with economic globalisation. Ironically, it was the US that helped to put these states back on the path to stability after the damage of the Second World War through Marshall Aid and security guarantees sufficient to underwrite the West European integration process.
