ABSTRACT
The political goals and strategies of employers have received increasing attention in comparative political economy in recent years. A focus on the role of employers in the introduction and expansion of welfare state programs and industrial relations institutions has come to challenge the conventional view of these institutions as the product of left-wing political power and class conflicts (Shalev 1983; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001), a view that assumes employers’ opposition to social policy. Employer-centered studies have questioned the validity of this assumption, arguing that employers often backed policies protecting workers because they thought that these policies would contribute to labor productivity and profitability (Jenkins and Brents 1991; Swenson 2002; Mares 2003a; Gordon 1994; Martin 2010: 565–6, 571; Martin and Swank forthcoming: 9). Research on the benefits of social policy and employee participation rights for the development of a skilled and cooperative workforce (Addison 2009; Estévez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 1991) has given additional credibility to the argument that business interests can be a source of social protection. I call this argument the “business interests thesis” because it contends that business interests do, in part, explain the generosity of the modern welfare state.
