ABSTRACT
Language and the Development of Moral Concepts We have already agreed that Piaget has brought powerful evidence to show that conceptual thought arises from the child's operations on the elements of experience, upon the objects and their attributes, and upon inherent relationships that are transformed by his actions. Piaget agrees that language plays an important role in conceptual thinking, but argues:
. . . that thought precedes language and that language confines itself to profoundly transforming thought by helping it to attain its form of equilibrium by means of a more advanced schematisation and a more mobile abstraction. (Piaget, 1954)
It is quite clear that many basic concepts are derived directly from experience and are in no way dependent on language for their development. The hardness of 'hard' is a meaning that is based on the child's personal experiences that lead him to anticipate and avoid abrupt contact with hard objects. The labels that he learns to attach to such dominant aspects of his experiencing may do little to aid the development of the concept, although they will offer him ready means for communicating the notion to others
Whilst it seems likely that the child would develop many lower order concepts without the help of language, it would also seem that higher order concepts, and those not readily gained from direct experience, are likely to be far more dependent on language for their development. The child is unable to form these higher order concepts, even though he may meet relevant experiences from which they could be abstracted, until his developing schemas make assimilation possible. Such concepts must await a necessary level of maturation, but the child's experiences contribute to the process of maturation, and amongst those experiences the language used by others plays its part in directing attention and placing experiences within a structure.
