ABSTRACT
D. Z. Phillips has characterized his work in moral philosophy as ‘interventions in ethics’, and no doubt we could describe his work in the philosophy of religion in similar terms. Such interventions are needed ‘because of our deep-rooted tendency to theorise in ethics’1 and the philosophy of religion. These ‘interventions’ are directed at the theoretical ambitions of philosophy and take the form of ‘reminders’, either ‘teaching differences’ or ‘elucidating philosophically neglected perspectives’,2 which show that the generalizing character of theoretical accounts is, when confronted by the actuality of moral and religious language use, obscuring and confusing in relation to the phenomena it is intended to illuminate. Such theorizing characteristically is related to the apparent possibility of raising fundamental questions about morality and religion, of whether moral concern or religious faith can be justified. The intellectual search then begins for an answer, whether affirmatively by reference to some foundation, metaphysical or in human nature, or negatively, proclaiming the absence of any such foundation and the necessity of a move to transform our language and life in new directions. Phillips’s ‘interventions’ have often utilized detailed references to works of literature, whose point is not, as some critics have believed, to provide the data for further theorizing, but rather to intervene in the desire for theorizing at all.
