ABSTRACT
Collingwood’s philosophical project was elaborated against the background of two philosophical views of which he was equally critical: realism and naturalism. Collingwood thus assumed the difficult role of criticising metaphysics against the realists while defending it against the naturalists. He performed this delicate balancing act by pursuing a critical reform of the metaphysical tradition. Collingwood, in other words, reformed metaphysics by recasting it in an epistemological key, i.e. through the elaboration of a descriptive metaphysics or metaphysics of experience. It is this recasting of the metaphysical task that allows Collingwood to present himself both as a critic of (dogmatic) metaphysics against the realists and a supporter of (descriptive) metaphysics against the naturalists. This chapter focuses on one horn of Collingwood’s dual critique, namely on his critical engagement with the philosophical naturalism exemplified by the neo-empiricist revival of the early and mid-twentieth century.
