ABSTRACT
The Chinese government moved swiftly to formalise relations with the new
Central Asian republics as they gained their independence after the collapse of
Soviet power in 1991.1 The independence of these states and China’s relationship
with them is important for China in general but of particular significance for
Xinjiang. On the one hand they are Xinjiang’s closest neighbours and vital for
trade and communications. On the other, they are the home of ethnic groups
related to the Turkic and other peoples of Xinjiang from whom they had been
separated for decades. Political stability in Central Asia could lead to
unprecedented economic development for China and the former Soviet states,
but there is still potential for serious conflict in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and
the impact of the end of the war in Afghanistan remains unclear. Some refugees,
fleeing the fighting in Tajikistan in 1992, moved into the Pamir mountains near
to the regions of Xinjiang where the Tajik-speaking and Shi’a Ismaili Wakh
people live. In Uzbekistan, there is growing support for militant Islamic groups,
particularly the rigid Saudi-backed Sunni Wahabbi sect which is funding the
building of mosques and madrasas (Qur’anic schools), some of which may be
providing military training. The Wahabbis are opposed both to Sufism, long
established in Central Asia and China, and to the Islamic Renaissance Party,
which is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.2
