ABSTRACT
A strong ‘market drive’ is currently changing the boundaries of firms and industries, the structure of regulatory relations, and the exposure of national economies. The task of overseeing these developments has largely fallen to competition policy authorities, regulatory agencies and trade administrators. However, concern is growing about the ability of mainstream neoclassical economics to advise on rules and institutions for dealing with new forms of economic and social coordination.1 Its narrow focus on mechanisms of market allocation and overburdening concern for auxiliary formal methods have only partly been redressed by the recent neoclassical interest in more diverse governance structures. Despite the apparent thematic convergence with classical and institutionalist policy studies, game and decision-theoretic analyses continue to pose methodological concerns and application problems.2 However, combining broadly defined market models and institutional perspectives on norms, contracts, and legislative and bureaucratic decisions widens the reference for assessing the institutions governing the current ‘market drive’ and ties neoclassical perspectives closer to the broader classical agenda.
