Most contemporary observers tended to argue, and historians have tended to accept, that the chief features of international relations during 1907–14 were effervescence of Anglo-German antagonism ¹ and the end of Anglo-Russian rivalry. ² To the factors that had exacerbated Anglo-German relations so far – the colonial quarrels, the shift in economic power in Germany’s favour and assertion centring on weltpolitik – was added the German decision to build dreadnoughts. To Britons, Germany seemed to be aiming at the creation of a navy that would be, to borrow Paul Kennedy’s graphic description, like ‘a sharp knife held gleaming and ready only a few inches away from the jugular vein of Germany’s most likely enemy, Britain’. ³ The anxiety on this score was enhanced by the fact that Germany possessed the most efficient army as well. The rancorous feeling against Germany was very much in evidence in the calculations of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, debates in Parliament, public speeches and comments in the press. As a result, most historians have also tended to see this as the motive force behind all diplomatic initiatives and manoeuvres during this period. In Anglo-Russian relations, the conclusion in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian entente by Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s government has been seen as the culmination of efforts made by successive British governments at least since the 1880s to sign some agreement with Russia. By implication, it is presumed that after 1907, the British government was relieved of all anxieties centring on Russia’s aims and policies.