ABSTRACT

These interpretations raise further issues which warrant elaboration. Before providing it, though, let me re-emphasise a feature of human agency which has been left undeveloped in the discussion so far, namely that the capacities of choice and intentionality involve much more than the transformational capacity of being able to 'make a difference'. The latter transformational power is shared by inanimate (e.g. hydrochloric acid) and animate (e.g. bees) agents alike. As a faculty of human beings it does not in itself presuppose that, when exercised, the agent need choose, or intend, i.e. plan in any way, or be aware of, the events that eventually ensue. With the exception of certain 'higher animals' most examples of agency appear to be restricted to this transformational capacity, this essentially behavioural response to the interplay between intrinsic conditions and external circumstances. In contrast, the interventions of human beings are, to the extent that they are intentional, to a greater or lesser extent under the individual's control, allowing that events really could have turned out differently.