ABSTRACT
Contrasted with denoting phrases are logically proper names, whose meaning is what they name. Ordinary proper names which do not name anything (and ultimately, for various reasons, all ordinary proper names) he regarded as disguised descriptions, and so as incomplete symbols, e.g. ‘Apollo’ stands for ‘The Greek sun-god’. Cf. MEANING. K.Donnellan, ‘Reference and definite descriptions’, Philosophical Review, 1966. (Often
reprinted. Distinguishes attributive and referential ways of interpreting definite descriptions.)
L.Linsky, Referring, RKP, 1967. (Mediates between Russell and Strawson.) S.Neale, Descriptions, MIT Press, 1990. (Develops and defends Russell’s theory, in
particular treating pronouns at length.) B.Russell, ‘On denoting’, Mind, 1905, reprinted in his Logic and Knowledge, Allen and
Unwin, 1956, and elsewhere. (Original version of theory of descriptions.) R.M.Sainsbury, Russell, RKP, 1979. (Chapter 4 discusses the theory.) P.F.Strawson, ‘On referring’, Mind, 1950, often reprinted. (Attacks the theory. Cf. also
Strawson’s ‘Identifying reference and truth-values’, Theoria, 1964, reprinted (with ‘On referring’) in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen, 1971. Russell replies in ‘Mr Strawson on referring’, Mind, 1957, reprinted in his My Philosophical Development, Allen and Unwin, 1959.)
. See NATURALISM.