ABSTRACT
One problem concerns how feelings are to be identified and described. How far can they be distinguished from each other intrinsically and without reference to causes or accompanying inclinations or dispositions? What is their role in the emotions, and how far can emotions and things like consciousness and PLEASURE be elucidated in terms of these? How do we use feelings in acquiring knowledge of the world and of other people? How do we know that they exist, if we do, in ourselves or others? Can we be deceived about our own feelings? Pain in particular has been a prime example in the PRIVATE LANGUAGE dispute. S.R.Leighton, ‘On feeling angry and elated’, Journal of Philosophy, 1988. (Discusses
feelings as they occur in emotions, with references.) A.R.Mele, ‘Akratic feelings’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50,
1989-90. (Can there be an analogue in feelings to INCONTINENT action?) R.Moran, ‘The expression of feeling in imagination’, Philosophical Review, 1994. (The
role of feeling in our aesthetic response to fiction.) R.C.Roberts, ‘What is an emotion? A sketch’, Philosophical Review, 1988. (First main
section discusses different kinds of feelings and relations between feelings and emotions.)
G.Ryle, ‘Feelings’, Philosophical Quarterly, 1951, reprinted in his Collected Papers, Hutchinson, 1971, vol. 2. (Various uses of ‘feel’ and relations between them. Cf. also his The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, 1949.)
. See SYLLOGISM.
