ABSTRACT
Finally, we can ‘believe in’ the existence, occurrence, truth, validity, or value of something, or in something we think ought to be or occur. We often use ‘believe in’ for what is good rather than bad; we ‘believe in’ Smith’s generosity but not his malevolence. R.M.Chisholm, ‘Firth on the ethics of belief’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 1991. (Relations between ethical and epistemological requirements.) D.Dennett, ‘Beyond belief’ in A.Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object, Clarendon, 1982,
reprinted with afterthoughts and other relevant items in his The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, 1987. General problems about belief (see especially pp. 54ff. (pp. 168ff. in reprint) on de re/de dicto distinction).
