ABSTRACT
The primary economic aim of completing the European internal market was to benefit the member states of the EC, not to raise the welfare of the world as a whole. It is, however, a matter of considerable diplomatic sensitivity whether non-EC states, either individually or collectively, will be better or worse off (absolutely or relatively) as a result of the 1992 programme. In any event the extent of any external gains or losses are, and will remain, difficult to calculate precisely, which given the nature of contemporary international relations, is likely to lead to external speculation and apprehension as well as enthusiasm. The fact that the exact details of the 1992 programme are not fixed but are constantly evolving serves to exacerbate this process and encourages attempts by non-EC states to influence that evolution. Furthermore the 1992 programme is inextricably interwoven, via the SEA and IGCs on EMU and political union, with the political objective of advancing the EC towards European union. The 1992 programme is therefore also an important factor in the general enhancement of the EC’s presence as both an economic and a political force in the international system and this is also likely to provoke a variety of external responses.
