ABSTRACT
The beginning of the end of fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon occurred on January 30, 1990. As recounted above, the sly Ja‛ja had said (December 1989) that he would fight the Syrians but support Hrāwi, Syria’s President of Lebanon. This was hardly a position to commend itself to a no-nonsense military man like General Aoun. On the 30th, a firefight broke out between the Aoun and Ja‛ja forces and spread rapidly throughout the Maronite enclave. This intra-Maronite war turned out to be one of the most destructive of all the rounds, causing more casualties in eighteen days than had occurred during six months of artillery bombardment by the Syrians in 1989. The fortunes of the two sides swung back and forth. The Ja‛ja forces held better positions while Aoun’s forces were more numerous and better equipped. After six weeks of fighting, interrupted by two ceasefires, Ja‛ja was in control of about two-thirds of the enclave, including the ports and the coastal area north to Jubayl; Aoun controlled most of Ashrafīyah and the southeastern approaches to B‛abdā of Ras al-Matn. The overall political effect of Samir Ja‛ja’s campaign was not to put himself in a position to dislodge Aoun but to contribute to the General’s strategic isolation. With other combatants in the neighborhood and 40,000 Syrian troops on his doorstep, Aoun could not move. He had attracted too many opponents.
