ABSTRACT
In this chapter I shall present an analysis of value pluralism in terms of incommensurability, and give a general account of how this conception of pluralism operates in an argument for toleration. A critique of this argument in its general form will show that it requires elaboration. Two ways in which this might be undertaken – as found in the work of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz – will be assessed. I shall conclude that, notwithstanding the attractions of incommensurability as a thesis about the nature of value, and its implications for our understanding of the human condition, defenders of toleration must take a different tack in justifying its personal and political practice. To anticipate, the metaphysical and existential facts constitutive of a conception of pluralism as permanently incommensurable are the wrong place to focus in the search for a justification of toleration. Instead of attending to the nature of the circumstances in which potential tolerators exist, we should instead attend directly to what is required of potential tolerators themselves in handling the oppositions that place them in the circumstances of toleration. Let me begin with an analysis of incommensurability, and a general account of its role in arguments for toleration.
