ABSTRACT
The previous chapter left evidence to indicate that, not only with the medieval world of Ockham, but also concerning our own grasp of metaphysics, we are far from clear on the depth and identity of the universe and how to depict its identity. This is even before we move on to enquiring about transcendence beyond the universe and/or outside of the physical domain. Summarising a trend of the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the idea of simplicity being the logically prior epistemological and empirical states in the universe is false, and that the reverse is true: complexity is prior to simplicity. Consequently, simplicity is not the defining of universalised or generalised knowledge. Rather, at best it is a symptom of the strategy in scientific discovery, which is a pale shadow of its richer ontological and conceptual parents: the actual external world. An upshot of this is that simplicity should not be confused with clear-headedness.
