ABSTRACT
Part of the solution to this collection of problems rests on the significance of one’s maintaining that content is irrelevant if and only if it does not belong to any concise subproof of such content. This concept of a subproof preserves20
the features of proof for finite sequences in which abstract irrelevance and redundancy are distinct. Anderson’s and Belnap’s21 relevance logic is not right since it presupposes that only if a propositional variable is shared by ‘A’ and ‘B’ is ‘A → B’ valid, especially in view of the incompleteness of relevance proof and semantics for first order logic. Lewy argued there to be a fundamental drawback of their work22: their relation of logical implication forbids suppression of premises and principles: there is no true entailment respecting the law of the disjunctive syllogism. If this is applied to the metalanguage relations of logic to enthymemes, it blocks enthymeme omissions.
