ABSTRACT
In contrast to presidentialism American style and in further contrast to French or Finnish semipresidentialism the Federal Republic has a parliamentary system of government. The lower house (Bundestag) upon the proposal of the Federal President selects the head of the government, the Chancellor. While the Chancellor is dependent on the support of the majority of the Bundestag, he can be dismissed from office only by a vote of constructive no confidence, that is, by the election of a successor with the majority of the members of the lower house. This inhibits major changes in government within a legislative period, but does not preclude the possibility of a major change in power, such as the successful constructive vote of no confidence against Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and for Helmut Kohl (CDU) on 1 October 1982 showed. In contrast to monarchical forms of parliamentary government, Germany’s parliamentary democracy is republican in nature. Although its executive is divided between the Chancellor, the head of government, and the Federal President, the head of state, the distribution of power favours the Chancellor. The Chancellor holds a powerful position vis-à-vis both parliament and the President, while the President’s role is mainly confined to the exercise of ‘dignified’ ceremonial functions. The exception is the President’s role in periods of major political crisis, for example when a chancellor does not obtain a stable majority of the votes in the upper house (Bundesrat) or when a motion of the Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not carried by the majority of the members of the lower house (Bundestag). In such a situation the President decides upon the dissolution of parliament. The normal case, however, is marked by dominance of the Chancellor and a weak role of the President. It is largely for this reason that Germany’s parliamentary government has been described as chancellor-dominated parliamentary government or a ‘chancellor’s democracy’ (Niclauss 1988).
