ABSTRACT
In view of the combined inhibiting factors of state sovereignty and the Cold War, only overwhelmingly compelling circumstances threatening international security and UN survival could make the idea of a UN ‘Legion’ an option worth exploration. The radical modification in the nature of war brought about by the development of atomic and hydrogen bombs had been at the origin of a gradual change in thinking on international security in the UN. Nuclear threat, coupled with the dangerous bi-polarization of the international system, made efforts to implement disarmament increasingly necessary. With the prospect of a Third World War, the idea of an international force linked to disarmament efforts had already appeared at the time of the Korea crisis. If the UN, however, was to prevent any aggression, whatever its origin, a UN ‘Legion’ alone would never be enough. Given the nature of the threat, true international security could be achieved only through general disarmament. The debate then took a new dimension, envisaging the progressive building of a UN force either as a logical corollary of gradual disarmament, or as a ‘world army’ able to enforce the will of the international community in the hypothetical context of general and complete disarmament. Hence one of the most striking paradoxes of recent history: an idea whose realization was made impossible precisely by the East-West confrontation was suddenly proposed as a potential solution to one of the most threatening consequences of the Cold War itself: nuclear competition. The idea of a UN ‘Legion’ had found a new forum.
