ABSTRACT

During the period of the Palestine Patrol covered in this book there were no formal rules of engagement comparable to those promulgated for instance during the Falklands War. The conduct of the naval patrols and of the reinforced Marine Section of the Palestine Police directed towards the boarding and arrest of the IJI vessels was mainly carried out by homing in from contacts made by air patrols. A naval officer had been appointed as Naval Liason Officer (NLO) to MILPAL, intelligence was received from Cairo and from Northern Mediterranean ports. Naval operation orders (Tableland) and RAF operation orders (Sunbeam) were both written in the combined operations room at Alexandria. The Palestine Patrol nearly always experienced difficulties through the scarcity of reliable intelligence and the post-war shortage of communication ratings in the ships keeping watch. Illegal ships were kept under observation to the three-mile limit and then stopped by approved methods of signals. Marine police launches reinforced by naval personnel were initially used in the final boarding and arrest. IJI ships were dealt in as humane a manner as possible1 and international law was being observed.