ABSTRACT
The ethical order of the virtues is understood to be divine in inspiration. It comes from the gods, who, together, illuminate a cosmos in which the physical, the aesthetic, and the ethical merge. This seems simple enough, yet there is something very odd about it. It is odd most obviously because the gods are notoriously unvirtuous in their behavior-at least, they are according to the poets. This was one of Plato’s main grievances against the poets, though we shall see that his attack was as much on the gods themselves. But the unvirtuous behavior of the gods is really only a side issue, or, perhaps, a sign. For the most important thing is that the gods are not the kind of being for whom the virtues are appropriate. What sense does it make to speak of a god as courageous? It is only among human beings, mortal, needy, and frail as they are, that virtue really matters. The ideal of virtue is divine, and in some way beyond human beings. But though the cosmos in its entirety gives rise to them, the virtues are uniquely human. And the humanity of the virtues explains the enduring interest of the gods in mortals: for in mortals, strangely, they find something-and something beautiful-that they themselves lack.1
