ABSTRACT
Auckland now considered his options, against the background of Vitkevitch’s success in Kabul, the conclusion of the treaty between Persia and Kandahar and the continuing siege of Herat, now openly assisted by Simonich. Auckland was also having trouble on his borders with Nepal and Burma, while there was a general sense of unease in India itself, exacerbated by the uncertainties beyond its western frontier, where reports were coming in suggesting that a long-expected Russian expedition against Khiva was also now imminent. Putting pen to paper in May 1838, Auckland sketched out three possible courses of action. 1 One was to do nothing and stay on the defensive on the line of the Indus. Another was to offer assistance to the chiefs of Kabul and Kandahar. Of these, he was clear that the first would be to admit ‘absolute defeat … we could scarcely, with prudence, allow this new and more formidable element of disorder and intrigue to be established, without opposition, on our frontiers’, especially given the evidence of ‘the extent to which Russia is carrying her system of interference on the very threshold of the British-Indian possessions’. The second option was also out of the question, since ‘Dost Mohammed Khan has shown himself to be so disaffected and ambitious that, with him, at least, we could form no satisfactory connection’. Also, he would be more likely to use any assets placed at his disposal against the Sikhs rather than the Persians. There was, however, a third option, ‘to permit or encourage the advance of Ranjeet Singh’s armies upon Cabul, under counsel and restriction, and as a subsidiary to his advance to organise an expedition headed by Shah Shuja’, a former Amir who had lost his throne in 1809 and had subsequently lived in India on a British pension. It is hard to understand how this proposal could have been launched in the face of the obvious objections. It was based, first, on the unwarranted assumption that Ranjit Singh would be prepared to undertake a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan. It also assumed that Shah Shuja, whose record was one of long-term rejection by the Afghans, would now, supported as he would be by infidel Sikhs, be acceptable to them. The idea that there was no possibility of forming a relationship with Dost Mohammed was also wholly at variance with Burnes’ consistent advice. However this may be, Auckland’s next step was to send the Secretary to the Government of India, William Macnaughten, to Lahore and Ludhiana, to concert a tripartite treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. This was to be an adaptation of the treaty that the latter two had concocted when Shah Shuja had undertaken an abortive invasion of Afghanistan in 1834. Under it, the Sikhs would invade Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass, while Shah Shuja, with a force paid for by the British and with British
officers, would invade to the south, via Shikapur and Kandahar. The treaty was signed by Ranjit Singh early in July and by Shah Shuja two weeks later.2
