ABSTRACT
The Soviet invasion was carried out with precision and efficiency. The two initial MRDs were followed by two more, the 54th and the 16th, which were deployed to Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif respectively. Within a few weeks, the total numbers making up what Moscow called its ‘Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan’ (LCSFA) were of the order of 85,000, with some 30,000 in support roles across the frontier. From then on, however, things did not go according to plan. The Soviets found that the Afghan army was in greater disarray than they had expected. Many of its soldiers had joined the resistance, others had simply deserted, and numbers had dropped from the 100,000 or so prior to the 1978 revolution to some 30-40,000, of whom probably less than half could be safely committed to battle. The invasion itself stimulated further defections, particularly among the officer corps. The expectation that it could fight the resistance alone, with Soviet troops providing logistic support and holding urban areas, strategic points and key routes, was soon belied. In March 1980, Moscow ordered the LCSFA to commence ‘joint operations’, the first being launched in Kunar the same month and the second in Paktia during June. When the attack on Kunar was launched, armoured units totalling some 5,000 men, preceded by an intense bombardment, trundled up the road through the main valley and ran into repeated ambushes. They managed to disperse the defenders and relieve the Afghan garrison at Chaga Serai, but their gains were only temporary. Unable to remain for logistic reasons, they withdrew, leaving the guerrillas free to return. In Paktia, the attacking force had helicopter support, but an entire battalion was ambushed and destroyed. The Soviet troops stayed in their vehicles and were massacred when their ammunition gave out. Along the main roads, ambushes took place, two of which, near the Salang Pass and on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad, were witnessed by the Times correspondent, Robert Fisk. It was evident to him that the Soviet troops involved had very little idea how to react. In July 1980, the Afghan 14th Armoured Division at Ghazni mutinied, and during the same month there was a revolt at the Pul-i-Charki base outside Kabul. Fighting also took place in Logar, on the strategic road between Kabul and Paktia, as well as around Herat and Kandahar.
