Introduction

In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as well as during the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’. Broadly speaking, this purports to describe a means of fighting through which a weaker power can offset or neutralise the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applying what strengths it has to its opponent’s weaknesses. The concept is as old as history and could, for example, be used to typify the encounter between David and Goliath. It fits set battles between trained and organised armies, as, for example, the Battle of Agincourt of 1415, where a stronger force including armoured horsemen was defeated by a weaker force using the armour-piercing longbow. More frequently, however, it is used to describe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrilla activity. In 9 AD, three Roman legions commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus were destroyed in the Teutoburger Wald by German tribesmen, having been lured onto terrain in which they were unable to deploy the tactical formations which would have rendered their superiority irresistible. Among the most spectacular of more recent examples were the Boer and Vietnam Wars, where the use of asymmetric tactics against regular forces was supplemented by political and public relations activity. The ability to erode the stronger power’s will to fight by adducing a moral dimension to the conflict is a valuable asset in an asymmetric context. For both parties, to ‘win hearts and minds’ is a significant step towards success.