ABSTRACT
Fifth-and this is directed at Ripstein’s argument specifically-it is very unclear why helping a just institution, namely emergency services, to assist someone else does not constitute a violation of my freedom, whereas helping that very person myself does. So to contrast those two acts make sense only if one takes the following two propositions to be true: (a) one is under a duty not to free-ride on just institutions; (b) one’s freedom is not undermined if one is prevented from acting in violation of one’s moral duties. Now, the proposition that one is under a duty not to free-ride on just institutions is not really in dispute. But the second proposition is implausible. For if it is indeed the case that one does not suffer a loss of freedom if one is prevented from acting in violation of one’s moral duties, it follows that imprisonment does not render the rightfully convicted murderer unfree-which is ludicrously counter-intuitive (Cohen 1991). Consequently, this second proposition cannot support the view that being held under a duty to someone to help them violates one’s freedom whereas a duty to the community to assist emergency services does not constitute such violation.
