ABSTRACT
When Caprivi took over the Admiralty, he expected to be allowed to concentrate on what he believed to the navy's top prioritiesÐplanning for a naval war against another European power, and training officers and personnel to fight in that war. His statement to the Reichstag of March 1884 had made that perfectly clear; he had even rejected the arguments of the Admiralty Council for preparations for commerce warfare. To Caprivi, the main theatre of action would be in the North Sea and the Baltic. Certainly some German naval strength would be siphoned off by the needs of the Foreign Office and for the protection of Germany's burgeoning overseas commerce, but Caprivi hoped that such ventures would be limited in scope and expense. Bismarck's decision, however short-lived, to pursue a policy of colonial expansion placed new and greater than ever strains on the navy. The need for ships changed drastically as the exponential increase in overseas duties necessitated a concentration on warships that could operate at long ranges. The seafaring officer corps split into two groups: those who saw regular service with the overseas squadrons, and those whose duties were more often in home waters. This would ultimately lead to a schism in the view of the duties of the navy and its best policy in the event of war. Furthermore, with the official recognition that ships on overseas duties were expected to contribute to the war effort, it was impossible for Caprivi to avoid the topic of guerre de course. However, he could try to redirect the main focus of the navy back to Europe, back to what he believed to be the main theatre of operations for the navy. Caprivi was willing to explore avenues of opportunity for the navy to be effective, but ultimately he continued to support and prepare for fleet action instead of an enhanced cruiser war.
