ABSTRACT
In early January 1942, as British forces stood facing Rommel at El Agheila, no doubts had yet surfaced about the wisdom of holding Malta. When the Chiefs of Staff, on 9 January, discussed a Middle East Appreciation, it was agreed that Operation ‘Acrobat’, the planned advance to Tripoli, should be carried out despite the growing diversion of forces to the Far East. 1 Such an advance would provide additional security for Malta, and this was important since the threat to the island was increasing. The arrival at Valletta on 19 January of three merchant ships carrying 21,000 tons of supplies, and successful voyages by the naval supply ships HMS Breconshire and HMS Glengyle, encouraged the view that, despite the recently arrived German air forces in Sicily, the island could be supplied from the east. However, the success of these operations was attributed in large part to the protection provided by long-range Beaufighters operating from airfields around Benghazi. All these plans and assumptions were overturned by Rommel's counter-attack on 21 January, which had, by the end of the month, forced the 8th Army back to the Gazala line west of Tobruk. Axis forces, once again, occupied the port of Benghazi and the surrounding airfields.
