ABSTRACT
In the years following their first annual review of Imperial Defence in 1926, 1 the Chiefs of Staff expressed mounting concern about the dilapidated state of the defences at naval bases. In 1930, having pointed out that, as a result of the London Naval Conference, ‘the reduction in the size of the Navy…tends, if anything, to increase the importance of adequate bases and fuelling stations’, their view about Malta was:
The armament of the coast defences is, generally speaking, in a pre-war state and totally inadequate to meet an attack by modern naval forces. In particular, the anti-aircraft defences are almost non-existent and are insufficient to meet even the weakest of air attacks. 2
Faced, however, with aggregate defence estimates that, as a result of the economic crisis of 1931, reached their lowest level in 1932, 3 the Chiefs took the view that other demands had a greater claim on their diminished resources.