ABSTRACT
On 5 July 1935, to their consternation and barely suppressed anger, 1 the Chiefs of Staff were advised by Hankey of the Prime Minister's request that ‘they keep in mind the military implications’ of the possible application of sanctions against Italy. 2 Admiral Chatfield, as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, immediately responded to this unwelcome development by insisting that, since sanctions meant war, the services must be given adequate time to make preparations, ‘if only to prevent Italy taking the opportunity of our unpreparedness to strike a military blow in some form against us at her own selected moment’. Right from the beginning of the crisis, therefore, it can be seen that the Cabinet and the Chiefs were concerned about the possibility of what came to be referred to as a ‘mad dog attack’. 3 This was a worry that was to have a major influence on British planning and decision making throughout the emergency, and especially in relation to Malta.
