ABSTRACT
Since the initiative lay with Hitler and British strategy was largely compelled to counter anticipated German moves, we may start by considering the implications for Malta of his Mediterranean strategy. 1 In his Directive No. 18 of 12 November 1940 Hitler laid down the main lines for the future conduct of the war. 2 Much of this Directive was devoted to Operation ‘Felix’, the plan to capture Gibraltar, and to the possible renewal of Operation ‘Sea-Lion’, the invasion of England, in the spring of 1941. With regard to the Balkans preparations were to be made for a possible occupation of the Greek mainland north of the Aegean, largely to protect the Rumanian oilfields. As for Russia, Hitler's overriding objective for 1941, ‘further directives will follow on this subject’. North Africa was covered in a brief paragraph that simply stated that one armoured division was to be held in readiness for North African operations, and that ‘German ships in Italian ports…will be converted to carry the largest possible forces either to Libya or to North-west Africa’. The air force was instructed to develop plans for attacks on Alexandria and the Suez Canal, but ‘the employment of German forces will be considered, if at all, only after the Italians have reached Mersa Matruh’. Malta was not mentioned. These plans were developed further on 10 December when, on the day after Wavell began his attack on the Italian forces in Egypt, Hitler issued instructions for the transfer of Fliegerkorps X, a balanced force of approximately 350 aircraft, from Norway to southern Italy. This force was made available, for a limited period only, to attack British shipping in the Sicilian Narrows. At that point, however, Hitler had no plans to send a military force to Libya. 3
