ABSTRACT
Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, mocks the naïve theory, which uncritically uses the word ‘this’ for ostensive definitions. No object simply shows itself without further ado. Empiricists are wrong in assuming that language rests upon a foundation of raw data, which can, on command, be pointed at unequivocally using the word ‘this’. Names cannot be easily analysed into simple components referring to some kind of presence; and the same is true for definitions of other allegedly simple terms, especially those that denote sensations or phenomenal qualities (colours, pains). ‘How do I recognize that this is red? – ‘‘I see that it is this; and then I know that that is what this is called.’’ – This? – What?!’ (PI: § 380). The sensation does not present itself directly to us without a proper linguistic setting, or particular use. The foundationalist fallacy rests upon a mistaken – representational – conception of name-thing relation. And that mistaken starting point leads philosophers into endless blind alleys.
