ABSTRACT
The philosophical discussion of the notion of personal identity, that is, the question of how we can conceive of the continuity of persons over time, seems to have reached a pivotal phase. Derek Parfit’s radical denial of the notion of personal identity and the subsistence of any personal essence over time, which he first formulated in his essay “Personal Identity” (1971) and later stratified in his ingenious Reasons and Persons (1984), has left the contemporary philosopher with the uneasy choice between reliance on the almost untenable notion of an inconceivable substratum of selfhood or the seemingly unthinkable, unethical (in the eyes of some of Parfit’s opponents) and, definitely, counter-intuitive rejection of personal identity. After all, we claim our identity with a past self every day in our self-presentation through stories, curricula vitae, and credit histories as well as through relationships to family relations, friends, and colleagues. Parfit’s rejection of the traditional conception of personhood and selfhood has received even more weight since it finds support in recent claims of leading cognitive scientists, such as Ray Jackendoff, and researchers of Artificial Intelligence (AI), such as Marvin Minsky (1985), that the cognitive processes of the mind do not necessitate an underlying, permanent self or Ego. 1 If true, the dictum of human selflessness would have implications beyond the realm of philosophy, influencing psychology, cognitive science, and, most of all, ethics because of the importance of the concept of personal identity to the questions of ethical accountability, responsibility, property rights, and the delineation of human life. These questions are central not only to general ethical theories but also to the evaluation of ethical and psychological consequences of contemporary technology and science, such as brain tissue transplants, 2 and real as well as possible achievements in the realm of AI, highlighted by popular entertainment à la Hollywood. It also affects the evaluation and treatment of special psychopathological cases such as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD). In addition, the notion of personal identity carries significant soteriological implications in that it seems to constitute a necessary condition for a belief in an afterlife, whatever form it may take. However, the main question that concerns me in this book can be summarized as follows: How is it possible to talk about persons, selves, and minds in the face of a theory of selflessness? Assuming that the dictum of selflessness, advanced not only by Parfit but also by David Hume, Jackendoff, Minsky, and, most importantly for the present enterprise, Buddhism, is viable, how is it possible to articulate and solve questions concerning the identity, continuity, personhood, and selfhood of the human individual? The present chapter will analyze the conception of personal identity as well as Parfit’s rejection of it and propose a way to talk meaningfully about the issues of personhood, selfhood, and the human experience of temporality without presupposing or even necessitating the notion of personal identity. Part Two will explore the notion of selfhood and temporality as advanced by Zen Master Dōgen and the philosopher NISHIDA Kitarō.
