ABSTRACT
Having introduced the philosophical problematic of personal identity in Part One, in Part Two, I will dialogue the positions of Dōgen and Nishida, as two representatives and exponents of Zen Buddhist philosophy, with major proponents of the phenomenological movement on the conceptions fundamental to the discourse on personal identity: selfhood, otherness, and continuity; the latter notion will necessitate a fourth chapter which briefly deals with the philosophy of time underlying the various positions on continuity of experience. The basic goal of these chapters is twofold. First, they will facilitate a comparative dialogue on notions fundamental to a philosophy of personhood. Second, they will explore the conceptual foundations of such a philosophy in the light of the loss of an enduring self and the rejection of the concept of personal identity so pervasive in both Buddhist philosophy and, to an increasing extent, in the intellectual atmosphere of the late twentieth century. As I have indicated in the “Introduction” of this work, the philosophy of the phenomenologists and existentialists in the twentieth century seems to be especially appropriate for this enterprise, since they share, to some degree, the methodological and conceptual concerns of a Zen philosophy. In addition and more importantly, I believe that such a dialogue will develop a terminological model which not only relates the major concepts of Zen Buddhism such as “no-self” (Jap.: muga ) and “enlightenment” (Jap.: satori ) to the philosophical discourse of the late twentieth century (and, probably, the beginning of the twenty-first century), but also provides a hermeneutical schema to help understand and evaluate the merits and difficulties inherent in the individual theories of self-awareness and personhood and categorize the various elements and levels of self-awareness. To facilitate such a dialogue, each individual chapter will first introduce a specific philosophical problematic (of selfhood, otherness, continuity, or temporality); it will then present a phenomenology of the particular topic which is not restricted to one individual thinker (such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty) but which maps out, instead, the fundamental issues and concepts of such a phenomenology; and finally, it will introduce the positions of Dōgen and Nishida against the background of the Buddhist tradition. The discussion of continuity constitutes the only exception to this scheme since the importance of this discussion to early Buddhist discourse warrants a separate treatment. Thus, Part Two will outline the conceptual framework for a theory of personhood and human experience in the light of selflessness.
