ABSTRACT
Most human behaviour has a moral meaning. It is virtuous, prudent, cowardly, dishonest, kind. Attributing such qualities is a crucial part of understanding it. But in the context of the relationships through which uncertainty is managed, and its burdens distributed, such attribution is not simple. Seemingly irresponsible behaviour may be the only way someone can retrieve a momentary space of psychological autonomy to make life bearable. Behaviour which seems, in itself, prudent risk avoidance, may have the effect of marginalizing and excluding others. Moral arguments about social policies have to take account of the complex chains of interaction through which chances in life are passed on. They are in part sociological arguments, where logic and evidence legitimize inference, as well as in part appeals to a moral sense we are presumed to share. But in contemporary Western societies we have great difficulty connecting the two parts. Both the traditional ways of doing so, through theology or ethical rationalism, have come to seem divisive rather than convergent. So the moral implications of sociological arguments are muzzled, and the moral arguments ignore the complexities of social relationships, and from this it is very difficult to articulate a moral consensus to sustain a politics of reciprocity. In conclusion, I want to explore this confusion, and suggest how we can begin to reintegrate social understanding and moral intuition.
